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NOTES
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1960 BANK MERGER ACT
AND ITS 1966 AMENDMENT: JUDICIAL MISUSE AND A
SUGGESTED APPROACH
In February, 1959, a bill "to provide safeguards against mergers and
consolidations of banks. . ." was introduced in the Senate,' thus com-
mencing a seven year perod of legislative investigation, debate and
compromise resulting in the Bank Merger Act of 19602 and the 1966
amendment to that Act.3 Many commentators have analyzed the history
of this legislation and have arrived at differing conclusions concerning
the effect of these Acts on bank mergers Moreover, many of these
writers have criticized decisions of the Supreme Court, decisions in
which the Court used the same legislative history.: The extensive but
conflicting use of this history indicates the need for an analysis divorced
from any views as to the wisdom of the legislation.
1. 105 CONG. REc. 2283 (1959).
2. Pub.L. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. III 1967).
4. "Although the precise meaning of the competitive factor was not elaborated in
the legislation, there is some indication that it was partially to be given content by refer-
ence to the monopoly standards applied under the Clayton Act." Comment, The 1966
Amendment To The Bank Merger Act, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 764, 769 (1966) (discussing
the legislative history of the 1960 Bank Merger Act) ;
The legislative history of the Bank Merger Act [of 1960] leaves not the
slightest doubt that what Congress intended was that the banking agencies
should have authority to approve or disapprove bank mergers as a substitute
for bringing them within the scope of Section 7 of the Clayton Act....
Seely, Banks And Antitrist, 83 BANKING L.J. 1035, 1042 (1966) ; "Congress has chosen
to rely upon vague concepts such as the 'community to be served,' 'competitive factors,'
'convenience and needs,' and 'public interest.' Unfortunately these concepts remain
undefined. Agency discretion, in effect, is unlimited." Legislative Section, The £966
Amendment To The Bank Merger Act; Economic Perspective And Legal Analysis, 20
VAND. L. REv. 200, 230 (1966); "The sponsors of the bill adopted made it clear that
the competitive standard to be applied under the merger act (amended) is that of the
antitrust laws. . . ." Via, Antitrust And The Amended Merger And Holding Company
Acts: The Search For Standards, 53 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1122 (1967). For a discussion of
the cases and the legislation that are the subject of this note see also Klebaner, Federal
Control of Bank Mergers, 37 ImD. L.J. 287 (1962) ; Lifland, The Supreme Court,
Congress And Bank Mergers, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 15 (1967); Wemple & Cutler.
The Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 994 (1961)
Comment, Bank Mergers and the Six Headed Monster, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 69 (1967)
Note, Fedoral Regulation of Bank Mergers; The Opposing Views of the Federal
Banking Agencies and the Justice Department, 75 HARV. L. REV. 756 (1962).
5. See generally United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171
(1968); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust of Lexington, Ky., 376 U.S. 665
(1964) ; and United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
BANK MERGER ACT
The legislation and attendant controversy focused on three issues:
the extent to which bank mergers merit competitive standards different
from those used in other industries; the proper authority-the Federal
Banking agencies or the Attorney General-to be charged with the primary
responsibility for approving a merger; and the checks to be placed on that
decision, either in the form of control given to other agencies or in the
form of avenues of appeal to the judiciary made available to interested
parties or agencies. This note will discuss the positions of the more vocal
and influential participants in the Congressional debates and hearings on
these issues and will determine which position triumphed or what com-
promise emerged.
1960-SENATE
Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency and chief opponent of applying the antitrust laws to bank
mergers, introduced on February 16, 1959, S. 1062,6 a bill to amend the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act to provide safeguards against mergers
and consolidations of banks which might lessen competition unduly or
tend unduly to create monopoly. The bill required prior approval of the
federal banking agencies before an insured bank could merge or consoli-
date with any other insured bank or directly or indirectly acquire its assets
or assume liability to pay its deposits. In granting or withholding this
approval the agencies were to consider both the six banking factors
enumerated in the F.D.I.C. Act 7 and the effect the merger might have on
competition. The latter was to be measured by a consideration of whether
the combination would lessen competition unduly or tend unduly to create
a monopoly.
Disagreement focused on competitive standards with the discussion
centering around the degree of control to be placed in the Justice Depart-
ment. The bill gave the banking agencies the option of seeking a nonbind-
ing analysis of the competitive factor by the Justice Department.8
6. Supra note 1 and S. 1062, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
7. The six bank factors the bill refers to are:
1) the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved,
2) the adequacy of its capital structure,
3) its future earnings prospects,
4) the general character of its management,
5) the convenience and needs of the community to be served,
6) and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes
of this act.
See also 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1964).
8. Hearings on S. io62 before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the Senate,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 1o62). The
federal banking agency having jurisdiction would be the Comptroller of the Currency,
if the acquiring, assuming or resulting bank is a national or a district bank; the Board
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Robertson's accompanying statement indicated that the purpose of the
bill was to authorize regulation on the basis of uniform standards involv-
ing both banking and competitive factors.' The statement also alluded to
pending bills that met the problem of rising concentration by applying
the language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers." Robert-
son refuted such applications of Clayton Section 7's strict standards:
Unrestricted competition . . . has not been the rule in the
banking industry for many years. The approval of a charter...
and the admission of a state bank to membership . . . are not
matters of routine. The financial history of the bank, if already
existing, the general character of its management and the con-
venience and needs of the community to be served must be con-
sidered. And once in business, the bank's activities are carefully
regulated by many agencies....
All these considerations make it impossible to subject
banks to the rules applicable to ordinary industrial and com-
mercial concerns not subject to regulation and not vested with
a public interest."
The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on Banking and
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, if the bank is to be a state member bank
(except a district bank) ; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, if the bank
is to be a nonmember insured bank (except a district bank). The bill provided that the
agency having jurisdiction over the merger would receive reports on the competitive
factor from the other agencies not involved in the decision.
9. 105 CONG. REc. 2294 (1959).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1967)
No Corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital, and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another Corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963), it was generally assumed that Section 7 of the Clayton Act applied
only to bank mergers by stock acquisition. Since asset acquisition was the major device
for accomplishing such mergers, the Clayton Act required amendment if it was to be the
tool to stop rising concentration in the banking industry.
The pending bills referred to above were: S. 724, which required prior notification
of certain corporate mergers to the Attorney General and provided a civil penalty for
noncompliance and would have plugged the supposed gap in the Clayton Act; and S.
1004 which prohibited the acquisition of assets of other banks by banks, banking as-
sociations or trust companies where the effect might be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend toward monopoly. Senator Robertson directed a letter to Senators
Eastland (Chairman of the Judiciary Committee) and Kefauver (Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly) referring to the above bills and requesting
that consideration be given the fact that his bill affected the same area. See Senate
Hearings on S. 1o62, at 1-7.
11. 105 CONG. REc. 2283 (1959).
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Currency, chaired by Senator Robertson.
In the Senate Committee hearings, Robertson introduced into the
record the opinions of the three banking agencies supporting the bill as
introduced, 12 and the opinion of the Justice Department. The Comptroller
of the Currency cited the use of the word "unduly" in the competitive
standard and noted that the standard provided needed flexibility for the
agencies in acting on a bank merger application." The Justice Department
assailed the same competitive standard and favored amending Section 7
of the Clayton Act to include bank mergers. 4 Thus, the extremities of
position were established at the outset. Although it appears that these
agencies differed in their view of the proper remedy for rising concen-
tration, much of this disagreement was caused by differing views as to the
efficacy of the then existing application of Clayton Section 7 in supplying
the needed flexibility. This need was discussed in the context of the failing
company doctrine."
The banking agencies and those committee members who supported
S. 1062 as introduced believed that the court applied a failing company
doctrine too narrow for the banking industry.1" Therefore, any legislation
that would amend and apply Section 7 of the Clayton Act to banks was
an anathema. However, Congressman Celler, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee and a chief proponent of amending Section 7 of the
Clayton Act to apply to all bank mergers, characterized S. 1062 as
insufficient to curb rising concentration of the banking industry.'
He interpreted International Shoe v. FTC as saying that the antitrust
laws will tolerate some lessening of competition; therefore, he be-
lieved Section 7 permitted those few mergers where lessened com-
petition in the banking industry would be desirable. 8 If agency approval
12. Senate Hearings on S. i062, at 62, 48.
13. Id., at 20.
14. Id., at 12. The Justice Department was alarmed at the rising concentration in
the banking industry and considered it to be against the public interest in competition.
Thus it felt that any measure short of amending Section 7 of the Clayton Act (the
best weapon available since its standards were not as difficult of proof at any early
stage as were the standards of the Sherman Act) would not effectively control bank
mergers. A good discussion of the Justice Department's position is contained in Note,
Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Opposing Views of the Federal Banking
Agencies and the Department of Justice, 75 HARV. L. REv. 756 (1962).
15. International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930). This case introduced the
failing company doctrine as a defense to an action under Clayton Section 7 where there
is no other prospective purchaser and one of the firms faces the possibility of business
failure.
16. Senate Hearings on S. 1o62, at 15.
17. Id., at 86.
18. Id., at 98, 99. Celler stated those instances which were illustrative of situations
in which he thought a merger substantially lessening competition could be approver
because it was in the public interest:
1) traditional failing company doctrine as enunciated in International Shoe;
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were to be substituted for the application of Section 7, he favored increased
participation by the Attorney General in the approval process along with
the holding of public hearings whenever the Attorney General filed an
unfavorable report on the competitive factor. 9 Underlying the differences
of opinion as to the degree of participation by the Justice Department was
the general feeling that the degree of control given the Department or
the banking agencies would reflect legislative recognition and approval of
the above agencies' tendency to emphasize their particular area of exper-
tise, either antitrust concerns or banking industry factors, in judging a
proposed merger.
Outlining the views of committee members is difficult since during
the hearings only five of fourteen members were vocal to any large degree:
Senators Bennett, Frear, Sparkman, Muskie and Robertson. Senator
Bennett favored the Robertson approach and asserted that banking pro-
blems should be analyzed in terms of "an organic, whole industry," not, as
he believed the Clayton Act required, in terms of a single institution."0
Bennett was joined to a lesser degree by Senator Frear, whose only
ascertainable concern was the use of the word "unduly" in the competitive
criteria.2 ' He believed that the standard was unclear and asked questions
directed toward defining the degree of latitude that would be allowed the
banking agencies in assessing competitive effect if "substantially" were
to be substituted for unduly. Robertson's only apparent committee op-
position during the hearings was Senators Sparkman and Muskie, who
were concerned with the level of participation by the Attorney General in
the decision making process and also with the use of the word "unduly"
in the competitive factor. Sparkman, who initially favored application of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, suggested requiring the Attorney General's
opinion on the competitive factor.2 Muskie was concerned over the mean-
ing of the competitive standard. Sharing a conviction of Senator Douglas
2) problem bank having inadequate capital or unsound assets;
3) where acquired bank has not made adequate provision for management
succession; or,
4) where several banks in a small town are compelled by an overbanked situa-
tion to resort to unsound competitive practices which may eventually have
an adverse effect upon the condition of the banks.
19. Senate Hearings on S. io62, at 90; see also the text of the O'Mahoney Amend-
ment which Celler endorsed, note 30 infra.
20. Id., at 28.
21. Id., at 28, 99. During exchanges between Robertson and O'Mahoney. Robertson
was asked to justify the use of the word "unduly." He stated that the term was less
rigid than others and further that it reflected a balancing of the comparative effects of
the merger. One of these meanings, the former, was to be lost in the House amendments
but apparently the other remained in spite of the changes. See 105 CoNG. REC. 8135
(1959).
22. Id., at 90.
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that the agencies were controlled by the banks, he believed that the banking
agencies, who were required to report to the agency having jurisdiction
over the merger,2 3 would function merely as rubber stamps.24
This divergence of opinion within the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee was reflected in the Committee report2 ' and in a lengthy supple-
mental report filed by Senators Muskie, Clark, Douglas and Proxmire.0
The committee report recommended amendment of the original bill to
require that the Attorney General's opinion on the competitive factor be
sought on each bank merger application. The report clearly set out the
considerations that led those supporting it away from the language of
Clayton Section 7.
The Committee concluded that [some mergers were in the
public interest and should be approved even though they might
result in a substantial lessening of competition.] The committee
concluded that the strict rule of Clayton Section 7, as inter-
preted in the Bethlehem Youngstown case27 [was inappropriate
to the field of banking.] S. 1062 provides for full consideration
of the public interest in the soundness . . . of the banking
system through recognition of the several banking factors of
Section 6 of F.D.I.C. Act and equally full consideration of the
public interest in promoting competition and preventing mono-
poly. S. 1062 gives no one of these factors controlling weight
but requires that all be considered, that all be duly weighed
and that a balanced judgment be reached.2"
In the supplemental report the other senators urged just as strongly the
need for more restrictions on mergers than the bill provided. They
preferred to give the Attorney General more influence by granting him
23. See note 8.
24. Senate Harhzgs on S. 1062, at 59 and 60.
25. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
26. Id., at 25.
27. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The court held that advantages of size were rejected by Congress in the plan for
preservation of a competitive system, and thus no distinction was to be made between
good and bad mergers; any benefits to the consumer that might have flowed from the,
proposed merger were irrelevant. This case would seem to completely negate any
"special" consideration for banks because of their "uniqueness."
28. S. REP. No. 196, supra note 25, at 19-21. The content of this standard is
indicated by the language of the Senate Committee Report to the effect that the wo-d
unduly was used to prevent the competitive effect of a merger from being controlling:
The word unduly is used to show that any lessening of competition or
tendency to monopoly which may be found by the agency-whether 'appreciable,'
'perceptible,' 'slight,' 'substantial,' 'serious,' or 'great' must be weighed and
considered by the banking agency as just one of several factors which will go to
form its balanced judgment.
Id., at 23.
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the power to stop bank mergers which he believed would "substantially"
lessen competition. Granting authority to the three banking agencies to
approve or disapprove mergers was deemed insufficient to assure that
competitive factors would be given weight; the agencies would be con-
cerned only with the financial health of the banks.29
In the course of the debates on S. 1062 three amendments were
offered, one by the Justice Department and two by committee members
of the Banking and Currency Committee. The initial and most volatile
exchanges took place over the amendment unsuccessfully offered at the
behest of the Attorney General's office by Senator O'Mahoney. This
amendment adopted substantially the position advocated by Congressman
Celler: the agencies would apply the standards of Clayton Section 7, with
four narrowly drawn exceptions, and would hold a judicially reviewable
public hearing on a merger if the Attorney General opposed it.3"
29.. Id.
30. 105 CONG. REc. 8113 (1959):
[The agencies] . . .shall not grant consent under this section to any merger,
consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities, where in any
section of the country the effect thereof may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly. This provision shall not, however, be
deemed to prohibit a merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets or assumption
of liabilities where . . . there is a reasonable probability of the ultimate
failure of the bank to be acquired; that because of inadequate or incompetent
management the acquired bank's future prospects are unfavorable and can be
corrected only by a merger or consolidation with the acquiring bank; that the
acquired bank is a problem bank with inadequate capital or unsound assets and
its acquisition by another bank would be the only practical means of dealing
with the problem; or that several banks in a small town are compelled by an
overbanked situation to resort to unsound competitive practices which may
eventually have an adverse effect upon the condition of such banks and the
merger of the two or more banks would, therefore, be in the public interest....
the appropriate agency shall request a report from the Attorney General of the
competitive facts involved in the merger.
If either or both of the banking agencies or the Attorney General dis-
approves the application in writing within thirty days, the Comptroller,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Corporation, as
the case may be, shall notify in writing the applicant and the disapproving
agency or agencies, or authority or Attorney General of the date for com-
mencement of a hearing by it on such application. Any such hearing shall be
commenced not less than ten nor more than thirty days after the Comptroller,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Corporation, as
the case may be, has given written notice to the applicant of the action of the
disapproving agency or agencies, authority, or Attorney General. The length
of any such hearing shall be determined by the Comptroller, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Corporation, as the case may
be, but it shall afford all interested parties a reasonable opportunity to
testify at such hearing. At the conclusion thereof, the Comptroller, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Corporation, as the case may
be, shall by order grant or deny the application on the basis of the record
made at such hearing. Such order may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia by any party adversely affected or by the Attorney
General within thirty days after entry of such order.
The Comptroller, the Board, and the Corporation shall submit to the
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Senator Douglas supported the O'Mahoney Amendment's use of
Clayton Section 7 criteria, thus aligning himself with those who accepted
the polar position of the Justice Department." Senator Kefauver joined
Douglas and O'Mahoney in voting for the O'Mahoney Amendment,
32
and noted that the Committee bill, plus then current interpretations of
Clayton Section 7, posed two conflicting standards: the Clayton Act for
stock sale or exchange; and the proposed committee bill for stock sale
or exchange as well as asset acquisition. 3
Less extreme than the position taken by O'Mahoney, Kefauver, and
Douglas were the positions taken by Senators Javits and Clark, also
members of the Banking and Currency Committee. Although he agreed
with the position of the O'Mahoney amendment on substitution of
"substantially" for "unduly," Javits' principal objection to that amend-
ment was the restrictiveness of the four narrow exceptions for approval
of an anticompetitive merger.3" Senator Clark opposed the public hearing
and judicial review provisions of the O'Mahoney Amendment, not for the
added restriction they would place upon the banking agencies but because
he feared addition of this quasi-judicial red tape would discourage desira-
ble mergers and thus offset the gains from increased participation by the
Justice Department. 5
The four senators concurring in the supplemental committee report
again agreed on an amendment proposed by Senator Sparkman, also of
the Banking and Currency Committee. The amendment required the
banking agencies to report every six months to the Banking and Currency.
Committee of each house of Congress all information regarding bank-
mergers which they had before them." This amendment was passed by
Congress a report each six months after approval of this Act setting forth
the following information with respect to each merger, consolidation, acquisi-
tion of assets, or assumption of liabilities approved by the Comptroller, the
Board, or the Corporation, as the case may be, the name of the receiving bank;,
the name of the absorbed bank; the total resources of the receiving bank; the
total resources of the absorbed bank; a copy of the report of the other two
banking agencies and of the Attorney General on the competitive factors involved
in the merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities.
31. 105 CONG. REc. 8127 (1959).
32. Id., at 8139.
33. Id., at 8131. See note 10 supra. The primary focus of the legislative hearings
and debates was the impact of Clayton Section 7, which reached the evils of monopoly
in its incipiency by demanding a scrutiny of the possible anti-competitive effects -of' a
combination. The Sherman Act was not then regarded as imposing such strict
prohibition. The Sherman Act (Section 1) is said to have been formed into a tool useful
against bank mergers by the decision in United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964). Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and
Bank Mergers, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 15, 27, 28 (1967).




the Senate along with the committee amendment requiring rather than
authorizing the banking agencies to request the opinion of the Attorney
General on the competitive factors involved in a proposed merger. \Vith
these exceptions the committee bill passed the Senate in the same form as
introduced by Senator Robertson. Thus, during the debates and in the
reports, all the more vocal participants, with the exceptions of Robertson,
Bennett, Frear and Fulbright, were dissatisfied to some extent with the
bill. Proxmire, Douglas, Kefauver and O'Mahoney expressed that dis-
satisfaction by voting for the O'Mahoney Amendment. However, Javits,
Clark and Sparkman, while not completely pleased with the bill, were not
drawn to the O'Mahoney Amendment. While Javits and Sparkman of-
fered amendments to correct perceived inadequacies in S. 1062, Spark-
man's amendment passing and Javits' failing, both Javits and Sparkman
voted against the extreme position embodied in the O'Mahoney Amend-
ment. Clark abstained from the vote thus impliedly rejecting that amend-
ment. Therefore, though dissatisfaction presented itself in the Senate, the
Robertson approach, endorsed by the three banking agencies, emerged
triumphant to be presented to the House. Clearly it was to no great
degree compromised by requiring rather than merely authorizing the
banking agencies to seek the Attorney General's views since his report
would in no way bind the agency.
1960-HOUSE
While it is quite clear that the position of Senator Robertson
emerged from the Senate, it is equally unclear precisely what changes S.
1062 underwent in the House. The bill was reported unanimously out of
the House Banking and Currency Committee with little debate." Con-
gressman Spense, Chairman of the Committee, had praise for the measure,
and the committee's only significant change was substitution of the
phrase "the effect of the transaction on competition (including any
tendency toward monopoly)" for Senator Robertson's phrase "whether
the effect thereof may be to lessen competition unduly or to tend unduly
to create a monopoly."3 This change probably resulted from the hearings
and executive sessions of Subcommittee No. 2, chaired by Congressman
Paul Brown.
The most vocal members of that subcommittee were Congressmen
Hiestand, Moorhead, Multer and Vanik. Perhaps the most effective
witness at the hearings was Congressman Celler. His testimony, sub-
stantially the same as that he had given before the Senate Committee.
37. S. ReP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959).
38. 106 CONG. RmC. 7257 (1960).
39. Id.
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criticized the "unduly" standard and espoused4" almost completely the
views of the O'Mahoney Amendment. Mr. Hiestand seemed unimpressed
with these views. He feared that if the word "unduly" was deleted or
changed many mergers might be prohibited although they were in the
public interest,4 and he exhibited a concern for the banking agencies'
need for flexibility to consider other than competitive factors in approving
mergers. 3 However, Hiestand seemed to stand in a minority position.
Congressmen Multer, Moorhead and Vanik seemed much more
impressed with Celler's testimony, which comported with their apparent
attitudes on the solution to the bank merger problem. Multer's statements
during the hearings seemed to advocate application of Clayton Act
standards with well-drawn exceptions.43 Moorhead agreed with Multer on
most issues and added only his opinion that the required Attorney
General's report on the competitive factor should receive almost con-
clusive weight."4 Vanik used the hearings to express his antimerger
feeling and advocate public hearings, as did other members, if only for
the deterrent effect of such hearings on mergers. 5
The committee's report at first glance seems to reflect Hiestand's
views on the relevance of the competitive factor:
Your committee is convinced that the Senate's approach
is basically sound .... We are concerned, however, with some
indications that under the Senate bill a merger could be ap-
proved even though it "unduly" lessened competition .... Most
witnesses agreed that a bank merger would serve the public
interest, even though it might lessen competiton substantially,
where there is a reasonable probability of the ultimate failure
of the bank to be acquired; or where because of inadequate or
incompetent management the acquired bank's future prospects
are unfavorable and can be corrected only by a merger with the
resulting bank; or where the acquired bank is a problem bank
with inadequate capital or unsound assets and the merger is the
only practicable means of solving the problem; or where several
40. Hotue Hearings on S. 1o62, at 123.
41. House Hearings on S. 1062, at 155.
42. Hearings on S. 1062 before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1960) (hereinafter cited as House
Hearings on S. io62).
43. 106 CONG. REc. 7259 (1960). These exceptions were substantially those in the
O'Mahoney Amendment.
44. House Hearings on S. io62, at 42, 69, 74, 87, 120 and 150.
45. Id. at 42, 69, 54, 74, 108 and 178.
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banks in a small town are compelled by an overbanked situation
to resort to unsound competitive practices.... ."
This reading is supported by the remarks of Congressmen Brown and
Spense, Chairmen respectively of the subcommittee and the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, who voiced the opinion during the
debates that the bill placed control of bank mergers in the banking
agencies, which possessed expert knowledge of the industry's problems.
Thus a conflict between the views of Multer, Moorhead and Vanik and the
bill as reported is apparent; this conflict is enigmatic since the bill was
reported with a unanimous vote of the committee.
A compromise seems to have been reached. Thus Multer departed
from his views during the hearings by issuing the following statement
during the debates:
The banking agencies are thus free to approve a bank merger
to save a failing bank, or to approve a merger brought about
by emergent conditions even though such action necessarily
lessens competition or creates a monopoly in the particular
community served. 8
The precise nature of the compromise is difficult to determine, but it is
noteworthy that even Congressman Celler urged passage of the bill
although he conceded it was not the type of bill he would have authored."0
The subcommittee seemed to have accepted Celler's criticisms of the
Robertson "unduly" standard, while still allowing approval of mergers
that substantially lessened competition or created a monopoly. From the
rejection of the "unduly" standard with its potential for decision making
flexibility, one could conclude that the banking agencies were now to be
more restricted in applying their expertise to override an unfavorable
report by the Attorney General. Thus, it appears the committee con-
curred on a competitive standard that stood somewhere between the
words "substantially" and "unduly."
The standard to be applied by banking agencies emerged as follows:
• . . the Comptroller, the Board, or the Corporation, as the
case may be, shall consider the financial history and condition
of each of the banks involved, the adequacy of its capital
structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character
of its management, the convenience and needs of the community
46. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1960); U.S. CODE CONG. & Ad
NEws, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2003-2005 (1960).
47. 106 CONG. REc. 7257 (1960).
48. Id.
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to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are con-
sistent with the purposes of this Act. The appropriate agency
shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction
on competition (including any tendency toward monopoly),
and shall not approve the transaction unless, after considering
all of such factors, it finds the transaction to be in the public
interest. . . . The Comptroller, the Board, or the Corporation
shall each include in its annual report to the Congress a descrip-
tion of each merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or
assumption of liabilities approved by it during the period
covered by the report.... ."
The effect of the House changes may be examined in light of the positions
taken by members of the Senate as it concurred in the House amendments.
The first comments were made by Senator Fulbright, a co-sponsor
of the original version of S. 1062, as he introduced the amended bill to
the Senate. The Senator stated that the six banking factors and the
competitive factor were to be weighted together and that the competitive
factor would not be controlling-points which seem to have been under-
stood by both chambers. He commented upon the rewording of the
competitive factor and injection of the phrase "in the public interest,"
stating with respect to the former:
This balancing of favorable and unfavorable banking
factors along with favorable and unfavorable competitive factors,
with no one of them being overlooked and no one of them
being controlling, was just what the Senate meant when it used
the word 'unduly' in referring to the competitive factors. I am
satisfied that the House has reached just the same result the
Senate reached .... 51
and with respect to the latter phrase he minimized its effect:
[it] is not a new standard in itself. It is not an eighth
factor.... The phrase is only used to indicate that if the merger
is to be approved the weighing of the seven specified factors
must have resulted in a finding favorable to a merger.52
49. Id., at 7258. Celler added that the Act would be of no use "... unless the
Banking agencies prohibit those mergers which have an anticompetitive effect as intended
by this measure...."
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id., at 9712.
52. Id. Fulbright seems to have chosen the second meaning placed on "unduly"
by Senator Robertson. See note 21 supra.
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The Senator did not find it necessary to comment on the statutory charge
that "the agency shall not approve . . . [a merger] unless it finds the
transaction to be in the public interest." In a letter to Senator Javits,
Mr. J. Russell Clark, superintendent of the banks of New York, labeled
the charge a presumption against bank mergers. He believed that if the
phrase operated merely to allocate the burden of proof it was not
objectionable; however, if it required a bank to show an affirmative
public interest benefit rather than merely an absence of competitive harm
to this same public interest it would be clearly undesirable. Robertson
answered the inquiry by stating that the phrase merely expressed the
net result of the type of merger that should be approved"3 and thus did
not have the importance Mr. Clark attached to it. Javits made no other
remarks after asking that Mr. Clark's question be recorded. Therefore,
the only position set forth as the Senate concurred in the House Amend-
ment was that of Senators Fulbright and Robertson. It seems fair to
conclude from their remarks that they viewed the passage of S. 1062 as a
triumph for the banking agencies.
Thus, while the precise position reflected in the original bill as
introduced by Robertson did not enjoy complete success, the views
expressed by the O'Mahoney Amendment were largely rejected. The
respective federal bank supervisory agencies were to make the decision op
insured bank mergers; the report of the Attorney General on competitive
aspects was to be advisory and not controlling. Deliberately omitted was
any attempt to specify or restrict the circumstances in which the federal
bank supervisory agencies might determine that a proposed bank merger
is in the public interest and should be approved notwithstanding its
effects on competiton. The omission of provisions for public hearings or
for judicial review of banking agency decisions also seems intentional.
However, the reluctance of Congress to clarify its new standards empha-
sizes the fact that the bill as passed was capable of enough diverse
interpretation to satisfy all but Mr. O'Mahoney.
TIE SUPREME COURT-1963
Subsequent to the passage of the 1960 Act, the Department of
Justice, as a result of disagreement with the Comptroller of the Currency,
53. 106 CONG. REC. 9714 (1960). The issues of burden of -proof and presumptions
were to become important in the judicial application of the 1966 amendment to the
Bank Merger Act of 1960. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390
U.S. 171 (1968), and the imposition of what one writer believes to be an insurmountable
burden of proof on the proponents of a bank merger. Edwards, Bank Mergers and the
Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85
BANKING L.J. 753 (1968). See also United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston
and United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
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filed antitrust suits attacking several mergers which had been approved
by the Comptroller. 4 Two of these cases, United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank" and United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust of Lezing-
ton,"0 reached the Supreme Court in 1963 and 1964.
The Philadelphia case held in broad terms that bank mergers, regard-
less of how they were accomplished, were subject to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. This decision was criticized by dissenting justices and by
many commentators as undercutting the purposes of the 1960 Bank
Mferger Act. 7 Whether these criticisms are well taken or not, the Court
mentioned repeatedly the legislative history of the 1960 Act and this use
of the history should be examined in light of the foregoing conclusions.
At the outset it is obvious that the decision itself is at variance with
the conclusion of the 1960 Congress that the prohibitions of Clayton
Section 7 were not intended to apply to bank mergers. However, the
Court was quite correct in asserting that there was no explicit exemption
of bank acquisitions have anticompetitive effects. . . ."" These state-
Merger Act. In considering whether the Bank Merger Act implicitly
repealed Section 7 as it applied to bank mergers, the Court relied quite
heavily on legislative history: ". . . the legislative history seems clearly to
refute any suggestion that applicability of the antitrust laws was to be
affected. . . ."" More explicitly, the Court said that ". . . Congress plainly
did not intend the 1960 Act to extinguish other sources of federal restraint
of bank acquisitions having anticompetitive effects. . . ." These state-
ments are an inappropriate use of the legislative history. The history
clearly refutes very little; the comments of the various participants could
be used to support almost any contention. General purpose possibly could
be drawn from the positions Congress rejected, and one position clearly
rejected was the application of Clayton Section 7's standards. Moreover,
the catalyst which prompted introduction of the Robertson Bill, defeat of
the O'Mahoney Amendment and enactment of the undefined compromise
bill was the concern of Congress with the applicability of the antitrust
54. See Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress and Bank Mergers, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 20 (1967).
55. 374U.S. 321 (1963).
56. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
57. Lifland, supra note 54, at 20-26; In the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case Justice
Harlan in his dissent said that:
I respectfully submit that this holding, which sanctions a remedy regarded by
Congress as inimical to the best interests of the banking industry and the
public, and which will in large measure serve to frustrate the objectives of the
Bank Merger Act, finds no justification in either the terms of the 1950
amendment of the Clayton Act or the history of the statute.
374 U.S. at 373,
58. 374 U.S. at 352.
59. Id. at 354.
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laws. It seems impossible to say in what way the antitrust laws were
affected, but the history surely reveals the purpose of Congress to affect
the juxtaposition of bank mergers and the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, as the Court commenced treatment of the legislative
history, it noted with respect to the lack of effect of the 1960 Congressional
gloss on the intent of an earlier Congress, that: "This holds true even
though misunderstanding of the scope of Section 7 may have played some
part in the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1960." " Assuming the
accuracy of this statement, the Court needed to proceed no further.
Certainly it was neither necessary nor even appropriate for the Court to
search for the 1960 Congressional intent when, if found, it would to a
large degree be based on a misconception that the Court was in the
process of correcting.
1966-SENATE
In April 1965 Senator Robertson introduced S. 1698,61 a bill
designed to place exclusive jurisdiction over bank mergers in the banking
agencies and to exempt all bank mergers, past and future, from the
antitrust laws.62 Robertson included with the bill his reasons for taking
such action:
The Supreme Court in the Philadelphia and Lexington
cases has rewritten the antitrust laws and has nullified the
intention of Congress in passing the Bank Merger Act.
My bill will reinstate the original purpose and intention of
Congress when it passed the Bank Merger Act. Since, in my
judgment, the Supreme Court has erroneously interpreted the
60. Id. at 349.
61. 111 CONG. REC. 6919 (1965).
62. Hearings on S. 1698 before the Subconnn. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 7 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings on S. 1698). The text of that bill is as follows:
• * . The authority to approve mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions of
stock or assets and assumptions of liabilities, herein conferred on the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the Corporation shall be exclusive and plenary, and any banks
participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of
this section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of the antitrust
laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act, with respect
to such transaction, whether accomplished by the acquisition of stock or the
acquisition of assets, or in any other way, and whether such transaction has
been or is hereafter consummated.
SEC. 2. No proceedings shall hereafter be instituted or prosecuted under
the antitrust laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act,
against any bank insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act by reason
of or with respect to any merger, consolidation or acquisition of stock or assets
and assumption of liabilities consummated before May 13, 1960, pursuant to
approval of the appropriate State or Federal bank supervisory authority.
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antitrust laws and the Bank Merger Act, my bill is drafted so
as to be applicable not only to future mergers, but to all mergers
heretofore consummated pursuant to appropriate regulatory
approval, including mergers now under attack by the Depart-
ment of Justice under the antitrust laws. 3
Hearings opened before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
of Robertson's Committee on Banking and Currency.6" Mr. Martin of
the Federal Reserve Board and Chairman Randall of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the only representatives of the federal banking
agencies who testified, supported wholeheartedly the position expressed
by Robertson and concurred in by Senator Bennett, still a member of the
committee :"3
All my bill does is seek to carry out the declared intention
of Congress in 1960, that these mergers should be under the
exclusive control of the banking agencies.... ."
However Robertson, Bennett and the representatives of the banking
agencies did not set the tone for most of the committee in the same
manner as they did during the 1960 Senate hearings. Rather, Senator
Proxmire emerged as the most vocal and effective member of the sub-
committee. His views prevailed with respect to both issues discussed:
application of the antitrust laws and forgiveness of agency approved
mergers then under attack by the Department of Justice.
Initially, Proxmire's inquiries sought a safeguard for competition.
He found little solace in the Robertson bill and felt that its passage would
increase the present degree of concentration in the banking industry.6"
Moreover he felt big banks served big business and discriminated against
small business, thus aggravating the concentration cycle." Senator Doug-
las accepted Proxmire's position and carried it further, remarking that the
American banking system was in grave danger of becoming a virtual
monopoly similar to the systems of England and Canada.6" The views of
both Douglas and Proxmire are exemplified by the latter's statement
that: ". . . because banks are protected against the adverse impact of
competition... it seems... that we can give more weight to competition
in banking than in any other industry."7 The bill as reported out of
63. 111 CONG. REc. 6920 (1965).
64. Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 12-14.
65. Id. Chairman Martin at 14, Chairman Randall at 231, 39.
66. Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 200.
67. Id., at 32, 88, and 137.
68. Id. at 83.
69. Id.
70. Id., at 138.
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committee reflected this position and left unchanged the application of
Philadelphia and Lexington to the banking industry. However, two
concessions to the banking industry were agreed upon: the bill gave
clearance to all past mergers; and required all future mergers to wait
thirty days before consummation in order that the Justice Department
might file an antitrust suit while the banks were still separate, while
prohibiting antitrust suits attacking the merger unless instituted within
the thirty day time period."
It seems clear that Proxmire's position continued the application of
the antitrust laws to bank mergers. However, this situation was affected,
it appears, by agreeing to the forgiveness provisions and the short statute
of limitations. Both concessions seem to stem from a common fear of the
evils of divestiture. This fear of "unscrambling" was shared by Robert-
son, Sparkman, Proxmire and most committee members who were vocal
during the Senate hearings. 2
The statute of limitations was first suggested by M11r. Martin of the
71. Id., at 9and 10; 111 CONG. REC. 13304 (1965). The text is as follows:
* . . The Comptroller, the Board, or the Corporation, as the case may be,
shall immediately notify the Attorney General of the approval of any merger,
consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities pursuant to
this subsection, and such transaction shall not be consummated until thirty
calendar days after the date of approval: Provided, however. That, if an
antitrust suit to enjoin such transaction is instituted within said thirty-day
period, the merger shall not be consummated until after the termination of
such antitrust suit and then only to the extent consistent with the final
judgment in such antitrust suit. Provided, further, That when the agency finds
that it must act immediately in order to prevent the probable failure of one of
the banks and reports on the competitive factors involved may be dispensed with,
the transaction may be consummated immediately upon approval by the agency:
Provided further, That, when an emergency exists requiring expeditious action
and reports on the competitive factors involved are requested within ten days,
the transaction may not be consummated within less than five calendar days
after approval by the agency. When a transaction is consummated pursuant
to the above procedure, no proceedings under the antitrust laws, including the
Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. 1-7) and the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12-27),
shall thereafter be instituted concerning the transaction. Notwithstanding the
above provisions, any merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption
of liabilities involving an insured bank, which was consummated prior to the
enactment of the amendment pursuant to the then appropriate regulatory
approval or approvals, State or Federal, and where the resulting bank has not
been dissolved or divided or has not effected a sale or distribution of assets
or has not taken any other similar action pursuant to a final judgment under
the antitrust laws prior to the enactment of this amendment, shall be exempt
from the antitrust laws including the Sherman Antitrust (15 U.S.C. 1-7)
and the Clayton Act (12 U.S.C. 12-27).
72. Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 76, 202. In connection with this fear Proxmire
stated:
What I think is perhaps most important . . . is to provide that those
banks that are already merged, that already have been scrambled, should not
have to undergo the agony and inequity and the financial loss and the disruption
of the economy in the community of being required now to unscramble.
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Federal Reserve Board as an acceptable alternative if the subcommittee
could not reach agreement on the original Robertson bill. Considering the
source of this proposal, Robertson and Bennett probably had no objection
to it when agreement could not be reached on other issues. In addition,
the concern of the remaining members of the committee with the difficulty
of unscrambling a consummated merger might explain the thirty day
limitation as a compromise between the positions of Robertson and
Proxmire. The committee report did little to simplify the positions dis-
cussed above other than to record the predicament that led to the bill:
"In view of the importance of prompt action to clarify the present
situation, the committee agreed, without dissent, to report a substitute
bill proposed by Senator Proxmire embodying the elements on which
there was unanimous agreement."7
The compromise bill enjoyed limited debate in the Senate. The only
measure discussed was its "forgiveness" of the cases then pending in
court, including the Lexington case which had already been decided.
Senator Hart, of the Senate Judiciary Committee, offered an amendment
opposing this measure and remarked that: "The anticompetitive effects
of prior mergers--especially when in litigation-can be just as dangerous
to our competitive economy as future ones."74 Hart also questioned the
shortness of the thirty day statute of limitations. However, the Senate
rejected his amendment and by implication his arguments." Some
clarification of the bill emerged from an exchange between Senators
Javits and Proxmire. When Javits inquired whether the bill would free
banks involved in a merger from an antitrust suit forever, Proxmire
replied that the thirty day limitation applied only to the merger itself and
any suit attacking its probable anticompetitive effect.77 The Senate
accepted the compromise bill without further discussion.'
1966-HousE
The House unlike the Senate indulged in extensive debate and
hearings. The usefulness of this debate in defining the bill that emerged
is questionable in view of the seemingly hasty compromise that took
place. The Senate bill was referred to the House Committee on Banking
73. S. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
74. 111 CONG. REC. 13307 (1965).
75. Id.
76. Id., at 13309.
77. Id., at 13308.
78. Emphasizing the rapidity with which the bill was passed is the fact that no
remarks were recorded recognizing what appeared to be a dual standard for judgifig the
validity of mergers: the banking agencies would be using the antitrust laws and the
amended Merger Act, while Justice used only the antitrust laws. This lack of uniformity
was a major issue as the House effected its changes in the language of the Senate bill.
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and Currency, chaired by Wright Patman, on June 14, 1965,7' but it was
not reported until February 8, 1966.8" During the bulk of this time
extensive hearings were conducted by the subcommittee on Domestic
Finance, also chaired by Patman.
Patman, on the day the Senate hearings opened, was quoted as having
said, "If you exempt banks from the antitrust laws you might as well
also shoot the policeman on the corner."'" This statement characterizes
the position assumed by Patman during the course of hearings, which were
marked by sharp differences of opinion. However, only some of these
differences related to bank mergers; others related only to problems caused
by rebellious members of the subcommittee.
Patman had not scheduled early hearings for the Senate bill, and it
appeared, once those hearings had begun, that they would not end in time
for presentation of the bill in that session. A series of motions made by
members of the subcommittee, Widnall, Brock, Clawsen and Stanton to
close the hearings and retire into executive session were ruled out of
order by Patman. The parliamentary maneuvers then began.82 Congress-
man Ashley, a member of the full committee participating in the hear-
ings, introduced in the House a substitute bill which provided for the
banking agencies to hold formal hearings on merger applications, subject
to review by a court of appeals as in the case of other administrative
agencies.8" The Attorney General commented adversely on the proposal,
particularly on the need for formal hearings and appellate review, although
he indicated that he had no objection to a provision that the courts and
the banking agencies should apply the same standards in future antitrust
proceedings.84 Consequently, Congressmen Ashley and Ottinger revised
79. Id., at 13432.
80. 112 CONG. REC. 2438 (1966).
81. N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 19, 1965, at 32, col. 1.
82. Hearings on S. 1698 before the Subcomin. on Domestic Finance of the House
Conmn. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 382, 392, 394, 397 (1965)
(hereinafter cited as House Hearings on S. 1698). The journey of this bill in Congress
was characterized by such compromise, maneuver and counter-maneuver that it was
the subject of an article captioned The Bank Merger Bill's Zany Journey in the Wall
Street Journal on Feb. 8, 1966.
83. H.R. 11011, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The bill required public notification
and a report from the Attorney General concerning the competitive factors involved
before a merger could be approved and provided that institutions having a competitive
relationship with a proposed merger be made parties to the approval proceedings. Mergers
approved in accordance with it were exempt from all antitrust proceedings.
84. See letter from Attorney General Katzenbach to Chairman Patman, Sept. 24,
1965 quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1965). The Attorney
General seemed to feel that in the vast majority of cases hearings would be unnecessary
where no serious antitrust problems were presented. Further he felt that a hearing full
enough for appellate review, with attendant disclosure of all pertinent financial data,
was not appropriate for bank mergers because of the traditional privacy surrounding
such information.
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the Ashley bill, deleting the provision for appellate review and providing
for original antitrust suits by the Department and the application of the
same standards by both courts and agencies. Neither the courts nor
agencies would approve a transaction in violation of the antitrust laws,
but both would consider the banking factors of the 1960 Act as well as
the effect on competition, and both could approve a transaction in whichi
the probable adverse competitive effect was clearly outweighed by the
public interest in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served. The revised bill encountered difficulty because of Patman's
refusal to call a committee meeting as requested by Ashley. A meeting was
then convened by Ashley with the assent of a majority of the committee
and, in defiance of Patman's wishes, the committee reported out the
Ashley-Ottinger bill." Patman deemed the session illegal and its action
85. See H.R. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; Brief for the Comptroller
at 12-22, United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 351 (1967).
Congressman Reuss, another member of the full committee participating in the hearings,
who had attempted to disband the rebellious session wrote to the Attorney General and
took the position that the Ashley Bill, as reported, was defective, and requested that the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury comment on his alternative proposal.
Following is the Ashley-Ottinger proposal and also the Reuss solution:
(1) The Ashley-Ottinger proposal:
The responsible agency shall not approve any merger transaction under
this subsection unless it finds that such transaction will not violate the anti-
trust laws, except that in considering the application of the antitrust laws to
merger transactions, the responsible agency, the Attorney General, and any court
reviewing the legality of such transaction shall take into account the effect on the
public interest and the community to be served of the following banking factors:
(A) the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved;
(B) the adequacy of its capital structure;
(C) its future earnings prospects;
(D) the general character of its management;
(E) the convenience and needs of the community to be served; and
(F) whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes
of this act.
A merger transaction which tends to lessen competition may be approved
where the probable adverse effect thereof is clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of such transaction in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served.
(2) The Reuss proposal (in other section identical with the Ashley-Ottinger
proposal)
The responsible agency shall not approve any proposed merger transaction-
(A) unless it finds that such transaction would not involve a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. 12).
(B) which would violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15
U.S.C. 1) or section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18) unless it finds that
the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.
In every case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial
and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed
institutions.
2 U.S. CODE COXG. & AD. Naws, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1869-71, and 1874 (1966).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
invalid,"8 but in an effort to compromise and retain control of his
committee, he reported out and supported a new bill embodying sub-
stantially the Ashley-Ottinger proposals with some revisions suggested by
the Attorney General."
Although the House hearings were extensive, they are of little help
in indicating the positions taken by the men who engineered the bill
because the issues and language discussed at that time gave no hint of
the changes that were to be written into the Proxmire bill. Patman's
position is relevant, but his desire to quell internal discord may have
neutralized the force he exerted in the direction indicated by his state-
ment at the opening of House hearings:
• . . [T]o weaken or in any way diminish the role of the
Justice Department in bank mergers cannot fail, it seems to me,
86. See Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 16.
87. The recommended revisions of the Attorney General were as follows:
1. Subsection [1] to read as follows: The responsible agency shall not approve
a proposed merger transaction unless it finds that such transaction will be in
the public interest, taking into consideration the effect of the transaction on
competition (including any tendency toward monopoly) and the importance of
protecting the public against bank insolvency. In determining the effect on com-
petition and the likelihood of insolvency, the agency shall take into account
the following factors, among others:
(A) The financial history and condition of each of the involved;
(B) The adequacy of their capital structure;
(C) Their future earnings prospects;
(D) The general character of their management; and
(E) The convenience and needs of the communities to be served.
2. Subsection (7) to read as follows: [information not requested on these
Sections by Reuss.](A) Any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of a merger
transaction shall be commenced prior to the earliest time under paragraph
(6) at which a merger transaction approved under paragraph (5) might be
consummated. The commencement of such an action shall stay the effectiveness
of the agency's approval unless the court shall otherwise specifically order.
In any such action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented.
(B) In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger transaction approved
under paragraph (5) on the ground that the merger transaction alone and of
itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of the Act
of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2), the
standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking
agencies are directed to apply with paragraph (5).
(C) Upon the consummation of a merger transaction in compliance with
this subsection and after the termination of any antitrust litigation commenced
within the period prescribed in this paragraph, or upon the termination of such
period if no such litigation is commenced therein, the transaction may not
thereafter be attacked in any judicial proceeding on the ground that it alone
and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2
of the Act of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
2), but nothing in this subsection shall exempt any bank resulting from a
merger transaction from complying with the antitrust laws after the con-
summation of such transaction.
U.S. CoDo CONG. & AD. NEws, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1873, 1874.
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to be harmful to the public interest and to banking itself ...
So we must consider carefully the equities here before passing
an ex post facto law legalizing unlawful, monopolistic mergers
condemned by the Courts.8
But, in the course of the hearings his comments reflected no compromise
either in his adamant view on the application of strong antitrust laws to
bank mergers, or in his belief that exemption of any mergers then before
the courts from these same antitrust laws would be totally inappropriate.
Yet he voted for the bill, while Weltner and Todd who agreed with
Patman during the hearings but were not subject to the same threat
posed by Ashley and his followers, voted against the bill.89 However, the
views of Patman, one of the most powerful men in the House should
not be completely dismissed because of the intrinsic pressures put upon
him. Although he adverted to "the convenience and needs of the com-
munity" factor as he reported out the bill, he failed to explain its content
and chose to devote much of his statement to the point that the bill effected
no substantive change in the antitrust laws other than to provide a very
limited exception to their prohibitions."0
'Mr. Widnall, who at the outset of the hearings seemed to endorse
a position almost as extreme as that of Robertson's, also voted for this
bill.' Unfortunately, Widnall said little in the debates on the floor of
the House that would give any indication of his reasons for acceptance of
this bill. However, he seemed strongly enough in favor of placing control
and responsibility in the banking agencies to make his presence felt.
Thus, the bill appears to be a compromise lying somewhere between the
views of Congressmen Patman and Widnall.
The compromise may be reflected in the remarks of Congressmen
Ashley and Reuss, who viewed themselves as chief architects of the
language used in the bill. Ashley felt the bill made it quite clear that
banking services stand on a different footing from other forms of economic
activity. He read the Philadelphia case to state that the antitrust laws
pievented the social or economic benefits of a bank merger from being
considered, and he thus saw the purpose of the bill to be assurance that the
Court could never again dismiss the inquiry into the community need
88. House Hearings on S. 1698, at 1.
89. 112 CONG. REc. 2467 (1966). Weltner felt that first the antitrust criteria should
be considered and then if this hurdle was cleared, reference could be made to "banking
factors." House Hearings on S. 1698, at 156, 867. Todd introduced six private bills for
the relief of the six banks originally exempted by the forgiveness provision of the
Proxmire Bill, and also stated that the only proper agencies to render a decision on
bank mergers were the Courts. Id. at 476, 508.
90. 112 CONG. REc. 2440-42 (1959).
91. See House Hearings on S. 1698, at 5; see also 112 CONG. IZc. 2467 (1966).
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for banking services which a proposed merger could provide.92 Reuss,
on the other hand, viewed the bill as not overturning the force and effect
of the Philadelphia case because that decision incorporated a definition
of competition in banking which encompassed many "banking factors"
and a view of the failing company doctrine with larger contours as it
applied to banks." Thus, despite their differing opinions as to the effect
on Philadelphia, both men arrived at substantially identical views as to
the bill's purpose vis-t-vis bank merger applications.
Unfortunately, the precise nature of this effect was obscured by the
vague language of the bill itself. The only remarks on the meaning of this
language that completely agree are those of Congressmen Weltner and
Gonzalez, who believed only seventy years of litigation could clarify it.9"
The bill embodied substantial changes from the language of the Proxmire
Compromise. A uniform standard, plus provisions to insure its uniform
application by the agencies and the courts, was injected; the degree of
forgiveness for the six cases exempted in the Senate bill was modified;
and the competitive factor was neither that embodied in the 1960 Act
nor a specific assent to the Philadelphia and Lexington cases. Rather, it
was of undefined content and was apparently controlling unless clearly
outweighed.
On February 9, 1966 the bill, as amended by the House, was laid
before the Senate.9" Robertson stated:
92. 112 CONG. REC. 2446 (1966).
93. Id., at 2445. It is important to note that although Reuss saw "the force and
effect" of the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case as unchanged, Congressman Multer, who
was instrumental in effecting the final language of the 1960 Act, felt that the 1966
amendment worked a great change in the existing situation:
If in the first instance, as is done here now [the Justice Department] had been
required to take into account all of the factors, very few, if not most of the
cases that were brought would not have been brought, and if the Court then
had a right to determine the case in each instance that was before it on the
basis of all the banking factors as well as competition, I have no doubt that
many, if not all, of the decisions would have been contrary to the result as
announced by the court.
112 CONG. REc. 2443 (1966).
94. Id. at 2452. Weltner, Todd and Gonzalez filed strong dissenting reports on the
bill as it came out of the Committee. With respect to the language of the bill, Congress-
man Fino agreed with Weltner and Gonzalez that many portions of the standards were
unclear, but this lack of clarity did not deter him from voting in favor of the bill.
112 CONG. REc. 2447, 2467 (1966). Congressman Minish, on the other hand, was not so
troubled with the language and felt that it clearly left intact the Philadelphia decision
and the application of the antitrust laws to bank mergers. 112 CONG. REc. 2451 (1959).
95. 112 CONG. REc. 2653 (1966). The operative provisions of that bill are:
(1) Standards.
(a) The responsible agency shall not approve-
(A) any proposed merger transaction which would result in a monopoly,
or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to mono-
polize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the
United States, or
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The bill before us will accomplish substantially what we had
in mind when we passed the Bank Merger Act in 1960 . . . to
regulate bank mergers under special standards designed to re-
flect the special considerations applicable to banking as a com-
petitive but regulated industry vested with a public interest."0
On this level of generality he was correct. Only two positions had been
soundly rejected in the history of this amendment: the position of
Senator Robertson in his original proposal for complete exemption of
banks from the antitrust laws and the positions of Congressmen Todd and
W7eltner who proposed the application, without exception, of those laws.
Robertson introduced a prepared statement into the record, but it does
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of
the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless
it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the trans-
action in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
In every case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and
proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community
to be served.
(b) In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger transaction approved under
paragraph (5) [above language] on the ground that the merger transaction
alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than
section 2 of the (Sherman Act), the standards applied by the Court shall be
identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply under
paragraph (5).
(c) In any such action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented.
(2) Stay on Consummation
(a) [T]he transaction may not be consummated before the thirtieth calendar
day after the date of approval by the agency.
(b) The commencement of such an action [under the antitrust laws] shall
stay the effectiveness of the agency's approval unless the court shall otherwise
specifically order.
(3) Immunity If Not Attacked.
Upon the consummation of a merger transaction in compliance with this
subsection and after the termination of any antitrust litigation commenced
within the period prescribed in this paragraph, or upon the termination of such
period if no such litigation is commenced therein, the transaction may not
thereafter be attacked in any judicial proceeding on the ground that it alone
of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 [of
the Sherman Act]....
(4) Past Mergers.
(a) Mergers consummated prior to June 17, 1963 [the date of the Philadelphia
National Bank case], are 'conclusively presumed to have not been in violation
of any antitrust laws other than section 2 [of the Sherman Act].'(b) Mergers consummated after June 16, 1963, and not attacked at enactment
may not 'be attacked after such date in any judicial proceeding on the ground
that it alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other
than section 2.'
(c) Mergers attacked after June 16, 1963, are subject to 'the substantive rule
of law set forth in' the law as amended.
96. Id.
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not appear to have been read orally. Thus, the more specific points in the
statement, although arguable constructions of the bill, were probably not
relied on to any great extent by the Senate as it concurred in the House
Amendment.
The bill was seriously opposed only by Senators Hart and Proxmire,
who felt it should be referred to the Judiciary Committee for study of the
meaning of the "new" standards and the effect of other provisions in the
bill." In answer to their opposition Robertson said only that:
• . . [T] he bill is a compromise. If we are not willing to accept
a reasonable compromise we do not get anything. I do not know
of anyone who has read the entire bill, who has studied it, and
who is interested in it, who would endorse it 100 per cent. But
it is the best bill we can get.98
I have been reliably informed that, having voted and
finally agreed to a compromise, the House will not make any
further changes in our behalf.9"
With little debate the Senate concurred.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the legislative history and
language of the 1966 Amendment. The compromise represented a signi-
ficant retreat from the position of the 1960 Act. Gone was the concept
of administrative finality as well as the advantage for banks that might
lay in the opportunity to merge before the Justice Department was ready
to file suit. Further, the competitive consideration was now of greater
but still undefined weight. Yet, the banking position made some advances
over the post-Philadelphia situation. Past mergers were protected against
the antitrust laws except Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the thirty day
statute of limitations gave the same protection to present mergers if not
attacked within that period. Finally, and probably most importantly, the
courts could not dismiss the public interest in matters other than com-
petition as irrelevant. Any further conclusions with respect to the content
of the standards by which agencies and courts were to judge a merger
cannot be made by reference to the legislative history.
Members of the House and Senate, although making specific re-
marks, seem to have agreed on only the very general purpose of changing
the existing situation while they disagreed on the nature of the existing
situation and the manner in which it should be modified.
97. Id., at 2658.
98. Id., at 2657.
99. Id., at 2652.
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THE SUPREME COURT 1967-1968
United States v. First City National Bank of Houston. and United
States v. Provident National Bank,' the first cases to come to the
Supreme Court under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, were decided in a
single opinion in which the Court was careful to point out that it expressed
no views on the merits of the mergers in question or the justifications
urged in their support and confined its decision to the procedural issues." 2
Those issues were three: the burden of proof under the 1966 Amendment;
the weight to be accorded the Comptroller's (Federal Banking Agencies)
prior decision; and the continuation of a stay of the merger pending
appeal to the Supreme Court before trial.
In placing the burden on the proponents of the merger, the Court
relied on the general rule on the burden of proving exceptions to pro-
hibitory statutes. In support of the intended application in this situation,
the Court cited the House Committee Report and a statement of Patman
that the proponent of the merger would have to carry the burden. The
Court cited Patman as the sponsor of the bill; however, in view of the
circumstances this sponsorship in no way gives his statements conclusory
effect. In light of the inconclusive history on this point the Court should
have relied on the statutory language which arguably could support their
conclusion. In holding that no weight need be accorded the Comptroller's
decision, the Court cited the general inconclusiveness of the history.
and proceeded to other support for its decision. On the issue of staying
consummation, the Court adverted to the legislative agreement concerning
the difficulty of unscrambling already consummated mergers and thus, it
seems, validly relied on a point which most proponents of the bill ad-
vanced.' Thus the Supreme Court was generally correct in its initial use
of legislative history of the 1966 amendment.
In the most recent decision by the Supreme Court, United States v,.
Third National Bank in Nashville,' the problems posed by specific use
of precise quotations from legislative history are more obvious. The issue
before the Court was substantive-the content of the standard enacted in
1966. The Court decided that the standard was that of the antitrust laws
with a limited exception for those mergers which clearly served the
100. 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
101. Id.
102. Id., at 369 n.1.
103. Id., at 367. The Court said: "The 1966 Act was the product of powerful con-
tending forces, each of which in the aftermath claimed more of a victory than it deserved,
leaving the controversy that finally abated in Congress to be finally resolved in the
courts.
104. Id. at 370. See text at note 30 supra.
105. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
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convenience and needs of the community. It chose first to cite Congress-
man Mlinish for the proposition that this bill was an exception to the
antitrust laws, not an entirely new standard replacing those laws and their
judicial gloss in the area of bank mergers. The Court's choice of Mr.
Minish in this instance... seems dubious when the history yields no
definitive agreement on this point and when other Congressmen also made
statements which were not as strong, and, in some instances, contradic-
tory to those of Miinish.' 0 '
The Court used Ashley's language along with that of Congressman
Multer to bolster its conclusion that the ultimate test was that of the
"public interest."1 8 Following this point the Court concluded from their
language that "public interest" reflected the net result of a consideration
of both the antitrust laws and the convenience and needs of the community.
The Court could as well have quoted remarks of Congressmen Celler,"00
other remarks of Multer.. ° or a number of other statements from those
who voted for the bill for varying reasons which would have presented
at least three differing views on the meaning of public interest. Thus, the
use of these specific remarks adds little, if anything, to the force of their
argument. In view of the Court's treatment of the legislative history in
the Houston and Provident cases, its liberal use of specific remarks here is
puzzling. The Court should have utilized the history as it generally did
in the earlier cases, conceding its inconclusiveness and using it only for
those issues on which there was agreement in terms of general purpose.
106. Id., at 184-85.
107. See the remarks of Congressman Stephens at 112 CONG. REc. 2450 (1966):
So we have compromised ideas and said that the antitrust laws do pertain to
banks if the criteria for bank mergers are not met as set [sic] in the bill .
See also the remarks of Congressman Stanton:
• ..not only does this bill set forth a single set of bank merger standards for
the supervisory agencies, the Justice Department, and the courts, it also gives
these standards equal weight as between economic and competitive cir-
cumstances....
and Congressman Weltner:
I think we catapult ourselves into seventy more years of litigation as to
the meaning of this [standard] if we depart from the antitrust laws as they
have been delineated over the past seventy years.
108. Supra note 106.
109. See 112 CONG. REC. 2449 (1966)
• .. It is the public interest which must be secondary. It is the anticompetitive
effect which must be primary. And only where the public interest outweighs
the anticompetitive effects [may a merger be consummated].
110. See 112 CONG. REc. 2449 (1966) for remarks of Multer to the effect that:
• .. If the public interest outweighs the anticompetitive effects the merger will
be approved.
and for a third view see the statement of Todd:
[the purpose of inserting the words "public interest"] was to make the anti-
trust intent tighter in its application than it would have been if we simply left
the phrase 'Convenience and needs of the community' in by itself.
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CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the 1960 and 1966 Bank Merger Acts yields
general purpose and policy. In some instances as discussed above it gives
more precise positions but these tend to concern procedural and not sub-
stantive provisions of the 1966 Act. The history shows compromise, which
expands the pages but not the meaning of the debates, hearings and reports
and, more importantly, tends to obscure specific Congressional intent.
Thus, the Court's and commentators' inquiries should more properly be
directed toward discovering this general purpose, which cannot be found
in the specific position that certain individuals chose to take on narrow
issues posed by the final language but rather in the positions these
individuals offered which Congress and the committees rejected. It is
the rejection of the positions advanced by O'Mahoney in 1960 and Robert-
son and Proxmire in 1966 which deserve increased study by the Courts.
Into these the Courts can safely delve and by elimination at least narrow
the possible positions taken by Congress.
Martin A. Traber
